





























































































































































required.	To	see	how	this	is	the	case,	we	need	to	get	clearer	on	what	is	meant	by	subjective	activity	as	it	relates	to	social	mobilization.			 One	of	Purcell’s	central	concerns	is	to	explain	how	it	is	that	so	much	of	the	populace	remains	politically	passive.	Political	passivity	is	the	idea	that	most	people	do	not	question	the	customs	and	institutions	of	centralized	and	cultural	power	(Ranciere’s	“police	order”).	In	other	words,	people	allow	the	decision-making	process	to	happen	in	a	heteronomous	manner,	and	seem	to	prefer	being	ruled	by	others.	Indeed,	according	to	Purcell	there	exists	a	deep	subjective	tendency	toward	“inertia,	inactivity,	passivity,	to	have	someone	else	make	decisions	for	us	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	93)”.	The	connection	between	subjective	passivity	and	heteronomy	is	now	evident.	Subjective	passivity	to	allow	others	(institutions	or	rulers)	to	make	decisions	for	us	is	heteronomy,	since	through	political	passivity	decisions	get	made	external	to	collective	will.	Like	Friedmann,	Purcell	blames	this	tendency	toward	passivity	on	the	governments,	institutions,	and	mass	media	for	effectively	brainwashing	the	populace	with	ideas	including	that	the	state			 is	identical	to	the	public,	that	it	exists	only	to	serve	our	interests,	that	we	would	descend	into	chaos	without	it.	Apple	actively	cajoles	us	into	believing	we	cannot	survive	without	an	iPad.	The	whole	complex	of	strategies...	[works]	to	keep	us	passive,	consuming,	and	governed	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	94).					While	a	lot	of	blame	can	be	placed	on	the	above	influences,	Purcell	admits	that	such	influences	only	work	because	we	already	have	a	desire	to	be	ruled.	Indeed,	this	is	why	the	project	of	democracy	“isn’t	so	much	the	project	to	confront	a	power	wielded	by	malevolent	forces	beyond	our	control.	Rather,	democracy	is	a	struggle	against	our	own	desire	for	oligarchy”	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	93).	Therefore,	subjectivity	involved	in	social	mobilization	must	be	capable	of	overcoming	its	desire	to	be	passively	ruled.		 Overcoming	this	desire	to	be	ruled,	according	to	Purcell,	requires	cultivating	a	desire	and	faculty	for	political	activity.	This	is	a	faculty	that	Purcell	claims	has	lacked	appropriate	exercise	in	liberal-democratic	culture	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	95).	To	
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Socially	Mobilized	Subjectivity:	Resisting	Passivity		 	Based	on	what	Purcell	has	described	with	regard	to	becoming	active,	as	well	as	the	type	of	society	Friedmann	envisions,	I	want	to	argue	that	socially	mobilized	subjectivity	relies	on	the	possibility	of	a	continuous	and	reasonably	consistent	attitude	of	overcoming	the	tendency	toward	passive	subjectivity.	That	is,	the	subject	of	active	social	mobilization	is	one	that	needs	to	continually	question	its	concrete	conditions	as	will	as	the	conditions	of	its	own	thinking.	Without	such	questioning	it	is	likely	to	fall	into	passivity	in	a	way	that	prevents	the	kind	of	struggle	for	democracy	expressed	by	Purcell,	and	implied	by	Friedmann.			 What	I	mean	by	the	subjective	questioning	of	concrete	conditions,	is	that	the	subject	must	attempt	to	consider	the	way	in	which	the	conditions	of	life	are	produced,	controlled,	and	decided	upon.	As	an	example,	for	me	to	be	truly	striving	for	democracy	in	Purcell	and	Friedmann’s	sense	I	need	to	be	critical	and	aware	of	how	I	get	hydropower,	for	example.	The	same	could	be	said	for	where	my	food	comes	from,	where	I	go	shopping,	etc.	If	I	do	not	strive	to	question	these	material	conditions	I	am	not	truly	striving	for	democracy.	Simply	allowing	these	conditions	to	remain	unquestioned	is	to	allow	someone	else	to	make	those	decisions	for	me,	and	fall	victim	to	heteronomy.	It	is	important	to	remember	that	I	may	not	succeed	in	understanding	the	intricacies	of	the	material	conditions	around	me,	but	to	be	struggling	for	democracy	means	I	at	least	need	to	try.	The	moment	I	get	comfortable	with	my	material	conditions	is	likely	the	moment	I	am	no	longer	striving	for	democracy.				 Questioning	the	conditions	of	my	own	thinking	is	connected	to	taking	responsibility	for	myself.	I	must	own	the	way	I	think,	and	as	Friedmann	argued,	I	must	cultivate	strong	independent	critical	thinking	skills.	Assumptions	we	might	have	about	ethics	and	humanity	for	example	are	just	other	ways	of	being	passive	and	not	taking	responsibility	for	how	we	think	and	treat	each	other.	To	use	Ranciere’s	term,	it	is	to	blindly	accept	the	‘police	order’.	To	be	truly	democratic	then,	is	to	always	be	questioning	your	own	ethical	intuitions	by	asking,	“have	I	really	done	
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enough?”	The	only	correct	answer	in	a	struggle	for	true	democracy	is	“no”.	Mobilized	activity	must	continue	its	effort	to	overcome	passivity	and	heteronomy.				 Activity,	as	opposed	to	passivity,	is	essentially	resisting	the	comfort	associated	with	accepting	the	given	socio-political	situation.	If	we	recall	from	Purcell’s	critique	of	Ranciere,	moments	of	social	mobilization	are	not	enough,	because	the	goal	of	the	true	democrat	is	a	‘generalized	breakthrough’	where	all	“insistently	push	out	further	toward	activity,	awareness,	and	democracy,	radically	so	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	121)”.	Therefore,	the	project	is	to	win	a	breakthrough	where	socially	mobilized	struggle,	and	where	subjects	strive	for	active	resistance,	is	generalized	in	the	population.	Based	on	my	reading	of	Purcell	and	Friedmann,	without	the	above-described	features	of	subjectivity,	their	political	theories	are	not	plausible.	Because	Purcell	has	set	up	passivity	as	the	enemy	of	democracy,	my	description	of	an	active	subject	seems	essential	if	perpetual	struggle	is	to	succeed.	Consider	the	subject	that	does	not	continually	consider	its	material	conditions,	or	the	conditions	of	its	thinking.	Following	Purcell’s	logic,	this	would	open	the	door	to	passivity,	heteronomy,	and	oligarchy.	For	Friedmann,	though	he	does	not	explicitly	discuss	passivity	and	activity,	his	description	of	the	self-production	of	life	seems	to	imply	the	need	for	a	similar	kind	of	subjectivity.	Indeed,	he	describes	the	need	for	resistance	to	leadership,	independent	critical	thinking,	and	the	collective	self-management	of	conditions.	For	this	reason	I	would	also	claim	Friedmann’s	view	fits	my	concept	of	socially	mobilized	subjectivity	as	perpetual	resistance	to	passivity.			
Conclusion		In	the	above	chapter	I	explored	what	it	means	to	be	a	socially	mobilized	subject.	I	argued	that	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	theories	rely	on	a	subjectivity	that	perpetually	resists	the	passivity	involved	in	accepting	its	conditions	through	a	perpetual	questioning	of	both	its	material	conditions,	and	the	conditions	of	its	thinking.	Without	these	features,	the	socially	mobilized	subject	risks	falling	into	passivity,	heteronomy,	and	oligarchy.	Because	of	this	I	argue	that	Friedmann	and	Purcell	are	indeed	committed	to	claim	2.	Their	views	rely	on	a	subject	capable	of	overcoming,	
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while	perhaps	not	completely,	at	least	significantly,	its	tendency	toward	passivity	as	described	by	Purcell,	and	implied	by	Friedmann.	Therefore,	the	next	chapter	will	consider	whether	this	view	of	subjectivity	is	plausible.								
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Chapter	Four:	Phenomenology	and	The	Limits	of	Socially	Mobilized	
Subjectivity		 The	act	of	becoming	aware	and	becoming	active	is	therefore	only	a	first	step…	the	second	step	must	be	to	fight	like	hell…	we	must	fight	to	stay	active,	to	ward	off	our	desire	for	heteronomy	and	oligarchy,	and	to	reaffirm	our	desire	for	autonomy	and	democracy	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	119).	
	
Introduction	
	The	above	is	a	powerful	sentiment,	the	kind	of	message	we	might	want	to	rally	around.	However,	is	this	kind	of	struggle	possible	on	a	consistent	basis?	That	is,	is	it	realistic,	or	even	possible	to	ward	off	passivity?	In	this	chapter	I	will	endeavor	to	answer	this	question	by	drawing	on	a	phenomenological	account	of	subjectivity.	This	will	involve	considering	the	requirements	previously	set	for	socially	mobilized	subjectivity.	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty’s	existential	phenomenology	offers	us	valuable	insights	that	problematize	the	passive/active	distinction	and	forces	us	to	reconsider	certain	assumptions	about	subjectivity	that	I	will	argue	are	included	in	socially	mobilized	subjectivity.		
Objective	Thought	and	Merleau-Ponty		It	is	useful	to	begin	by	briefly	explaining	phenomenology	as	a	method	of	philosophical	inquiry.	Phenomenology	is	essentially	a	study	of	the	structural	features	of	experience,	as	they	are	perceived	(J.	Smith,	2017).	This	amounts	to	a	philosophy	that	is	highly	descriptive	of	the	phenomena	of	experience.		 In	Phenomenology	of	Perception,	Merleau-Ponty	problematizes	an	idea	about	perception	he	calls	‘objective	thought’.	Objective	thought	is	the	name	Merleau-Ponty	uses	to	describe	a	certain	way	of	describing	the	subject’s	relationship	with	perception	and	the	world	(See:	Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	pp.	69-74;	Dreyfus,	2002,	p.	378).	As	Lawrence	Hass	puts,	objective	thought	is		
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The	view	that	external	material	objects	activate	one’s	sense	organs,	which	cause	sensations	in	one’s	mind	or	brain,	which	in	turn	the	understanding	compiles	or	“internally	represents”	as	perceived	objects	such	as	a	table	and	chairs	(Hass,	2008,	p.	29).		According	to	objective	thought,	we	operate	in	the	world	by	developing	certain	mental	representations	of	perceived	sense	datum.	For	example,	according	to	objective	thought	the	reason	I	perceive	a	chair	as	something	to	sit	in	is	because	I	have	learned	to	develop	the	concept	of	chair	as	a	mental	representation	in	my	head,	and	corresponding	conceptual	content	pointing	to	its	usefulness.	The	idea	being	that	I	recognize	the	chair	because	I	have	the	concept	of	chair	in	mind	and	I	can	compare	my	perception	to	my	mental	representation	of	chair,	and	then	recognize	it.	Therefore,	for	objective	thought,	mental	representations	function	to	bridge	the	divide	between	perceiver	and	perceived	world,	and	allow	the	subject	to	function	in	the	world.	Thus,	the	subject	relies	on	developing	mental	representations	that	accurately	reflect	objects	perceived	in	sense	datum	(Dreyfus,	2002,	p.	377).		One	of	the	implications	of	this	view	is	that	it	essentially	accepts	the	idea	that	the	world	and	the	subject	perceiving	that	world	are	separated.	Another	way	of	thinking	about	this	is	to	imagine	that	you	have	the	world	on	the	one	hand,	functioning	as	sense	datum.	And	you	have	the	‘thinking	subject’	on	the	other	hand,	actively	receiving	and	interpreting	the	perceived	world.	The	crucial	point	to	notice	here	is	the	primacy	these	views	place	on	the	‘thinking	subject’.	By	thinking	subject	I	mean	that	the	primary	mode	of	being	for	the	subject	on	this	view	is	that	it	thinks,	it	is	always	interpreting	its	perceptions,	and	building	mental	representations	to	better	operate	in	that	world.	Put	another	way,	on	this	view	the	subject	spends	its	time	consciously	aware	of	its	desires,	and	its	actions.	The	thinking	subject,	by	and	large,	holds	its	desire	and	action	in	the	foreground	of	awareness.		An	important	point	to	flag	is	that	this	view	of	subjectivity	affords	the	subject	a	significant	amount	of	control	and	autonomy.	This	is	because	mental	representations	are	by	their	nature	actively	grasped	and	judged	by	us.	On	this	view,	the	thinking	subject	is	always	actively	aware	of	the	mental	representations	that	make	sense	of	the	perceptual	world.	Not	being	actively	aware	of	the	conditions	of	its	
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actions	and	desires	would	necessarily	reduce	subjective	control.	In	other	words,	active	awareness	is	a	necessary	step	for	having	autonomy.		
Social	Mobilization	and	the	‘Thinking	Subject’	
	I	want	to	make	the	claim	that	social	mobilization	views	like	Friedmann	and	Purcell’s	accept	a	version	of	‘objective	thought’	in	their	implied	accounts	of	subjectivity.	Such	views	essentially	argue	that	the	reason	people	are	not	socially	mobilizing	is	because	they	do	not	have	the	right	kind	of	mental	representations	in	their	minds,	the	kind	that	would	allow	for	sustained	coordinated	resistance.	This	is	why	Friedmann	and	Purcell	spend	so	much	time	talking	about	people	becoming	aware	of	their	conditions,	and	realize	how	they	are	being	manipulated	into	passivity	by	vacuous	desires	in	media	and	neoliberal	culture.	Indeed,	social	mobilizations	requirement	to	constantly	question	our	material	conditions	and	the	conditions	of	our	thinking	is	to	render	them	into	continually	graspable	mental	representations.		Purcell	explains	the	lack	of	active	political	resistance	partially	by	ascribing	a	
desire	to	be	passive.	This	desire	supposedly	comes	from	the	idea	that	people	would	rather	let	others	take	care	of	them,	a	desire	to	regress	to	an	infant	state.	To	overcome	this	requires	that	people	cultivate	a	new	desire	to	be	active,	to	realize	that	the	desire	for	passivity	is	mistaken	and	the	result	of	manipulation,	and	that	being	active	is	actually	in	our	best	interest.	The	key	point	here	is	that	such	desires	for	passivity	are	still	the	kind	of	thing	that	can	at	least	be	partially	overcome	by	becoming	aware.	In	other	words,	political	action	depends	on	the	right	kinds	of	collective	beliefs	(mental	representations).	In	a	way,	political	passivity	is	reduced	to	a	failure	to	think	properly,	to	realize	what	is	in	our	interest.	This	account,	I	would	argue,	is	consistent	with	subjectivity	as	privileging	the	actively	‘thinking	subject’,	a	subject	that	acts	on	beliefs	and	mental	representations.		In	the	next	few	pages,	I	will	explain	how	Merleau-Ponty	makes	this	entire	view	of	the	thinking	subject	problematic.	What	Merleau-Ponty	argues	in	
Phenomenology	of	Perception	is	that	the	subject	of	perception	relies	much	less	on	conscious	mental	representations,	and	is	more	intertwined	with	the	world	it	
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perceives.	Indeed,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	the	subject	takes	a	much	more	passive	role	in	perception	and	engagement	with	the	world.		 	
The	Habit-Body	and	Non-Representational	Passive	Perception			According	to	Merleau-Ponty,	subjectivity	does	not	act	primarily	on	beliefs	or	mental	representations,	but	rather	on	the	basis	of	embodied	habituation.	As	we	can	recall,	objective	thought	argues	that	actions	in	the	world	depend	on	conscious	mental	representations	of	objects	and	ideas	in	the	world.	For	example,	walking	to	a	window	and	opening	it	depends	on	mental	representational	content	that	allows	us	to	recognize	the	windows.	To	be	sure,	Merleau-Ponty	does	not	deny	that	we	can	have	mental	representations,	such	as	windows	and	chairs.	Rather,	he	argues	that	mental	representations	are	rarely	involved	in	everyday	actions.	Actions	are	normally	accomplished	because	our	bodies	have	become	attuned	with	certain	habits	of	movement	and	passive	sensitivities	to	particular	contexts	(See:	Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	pp.	143-148).			The	best	way	to	explain	Merleau-Ponty’s	view	of	the	habit-body	is	to	analyze	skill	acquisition.	Consider	already	acquired	skills.	For	example,	when	I	tie	my	shoes	I	am	not	thinking	about	each	movement	of	my	fingers,	comparing	it	with	a	representation	of	how	shoes	should	be	tied.	When	I	drive	I	do	not	concentrate	on	the	movements	in	my	feet	by	calculating	the	amount	of	pressure	needed	to	accomplish	my	task.	On	the	contrary,	the	above	best	describes	the	experience	of	trying	to	learn	a	new	task.	Indeed,	consider	the	perceptual	difference	between	driving	for	the	first	time,	and	driving	now.	In	the	first	instance	I	am	clumsy,	my	movements	are	inconsistent	and	overly	deliberate.	I	have	to	think	carefully	about	each	movement	in	a	way	that	almost	prevents	me	from	doing	anything.	Most	experienced	drivers	can	likely	recall	being	on	‘autopilot’,	only	to	arrive	at	their	destination	with	almost	no	memory	of	the	journey.	Similar	experiences	can	likely	be	recalled	in	cases	of	walking	a	familiar	route	through	a	neighborhood.	Also,	consider	typing	on	a	keyboard.	Typing	quickly	and	effectively	depends	almost	on	not	thinking	about	the	movements	of	your	fingers	and	just	allowing	your	body	to	do	the	work	for	
58		
you.	We	develop	the	above-mentioned	skills	not	by	thinking	and	developing	a	mental	representation,	but	by	exposing	our	bodies	to	repeated	situations	and	movements.	Acquiring	skills	and	habits	in	this	way	results	in	an	alteration	of	the	way	perceptions	appear	for	us	(See:	Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	pp.	153-155).	This	is	an	important	point.	The	result	of	habituation	is	that	all	perceptions	come	with	built	in	values	and	claims,	many	of	them	related	to	opportunities	and	demands	for	action.	That	is,	everyday	perceptions	point	our	attention	towards	certain	aspects,	and	lead	us	to	ignore	others.	These	experiences	appear	in	perception	not	as	the	result	of	conscious	judgment,	but	are	passive	responses	resulting	from	embodied	habituation.	I	see	the	traffic	light	turn	red	and	the	perception	is	a	prohibition	on	certain	actions.	Before	I	can	reflect	on	the	idea	of	red	light	as	a	concept,	my	body	becomes	passively	sensitive	to	the	situation	and	responds	by	pressing	the	breaks.	Consider	an	experienced	hockey	player.	The	player	does	not	see	the	lines	on	the	rink	as	simply	colored	lines,	but	rather	perceives	them	as	actual	opportunities	and	limits	on	action	within	their	context.	The	hockey	puck	is	not	simply	a	black	disk,	but	rather,	it	becomes	–	as	a	result	of	the	player’s	involvement	–	a	puck	to-be-intercepted,	and	to-be-shot	into	the	opposing	teams	net.	Conscious	judgment	and	conceptual	thinking	play	only	a	minor	role	in	such	situations	with	the	primary	mode	being	passive	sensitivities	to	the	context	resulting	from	embodied	habituation.	Imagine	the	alternate	scenario,	one	where	each	time	the	hockey	player	encountered	the	blue	line,	they	would	have	to	accomplish	a	mental	inference	to	remember	what	role	it	plays.	In	such	a	circumstance	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	successful	skillfulness.	Considering	other	examples,	the	difference	between	how	a	skilled	climber	and	a	novice	climber	perceive	a	steep	rock	face	is	instructive.	Whereas	the	skilled	climber	will	perceive	the	textured	rock	face	as	containing	several	opportunities	for	climbing,	the	novice	may	only	see	an	impassable	rock	wall.	Moreover,	imagine	watching	a	movie	that	is	supposed	to	be	set	in	a	pacific	northwestern	forest	but	was	actually	filmed	in	the	Appalachia.	Most	of	us	would	never	notice.	However,	for	an	experienced	botanist	the	fact	that	certain	species	of	tree	or	plant	does	not	belong	would	likely	jump	out	at	them.	Both	the	botanist	and	non-botanist	are	viewing	the	
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same	visual	stimuli	however	for	the	botanist,	due	to	their	training	(habit),	different	details	are	called	forth.	These	examples	support	Merleau-Ponty’s	claim	that	our	primary	mode	of	being	in	the	world	is	through	a	process	of	being	exposed	and	exposing	ourselves	to	movements	and	situations	to	the	point	that	our	bodies	reconfigure	themselves	to	perceive	appropriately	in	the	given	situation	(what	Herbert	Dreyfus	calls	‘absorbed	coping’	(Dreyfus,	2002,	p.	378)).	Unlike	traditional	philosophical	views	that	imply	a	mind-body	dualism,	Merleau-Ponty’s	view	emphasizes	the	role	that	the	body	plays	in	subjectivity.	Indeed,	the	body	is	our	ontology.	For	Merleau-Ponty,	habit	is	a	crucial	ontological	feature.		If	we	consider	the	world	the	subject	is	born	into,	depending	on	the	culture	it	finds	itself	in,	certain	cultural	customs	function	like	embodied	habits	and	become	part	of	perceptual	reality.	There	are	always	already	passively	experienced	action	and	value-laden	perceptions	of	the	world.	Seeing	two	people	walking	down	the	street	holding	hands	points	to	the	claim	that	they	are	a	romantic	couple	(and	ignores	other	possibilities).	Again,	there	is	no	conscious	inference	or	mental	representation	in	these	experiences,	the	perception	simply	shows	up	as	such.	Just	like	the	acquisition	of	skills	of	movement,	this	perceptual	directionality	is	experienced	passively	as	a	result	of	the	subject	coping	with	the	milieu	of	contingent	social	signifiers	and	customs	(Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	p.	363).	For	Merleau-Ponty,	the	subject	is	always	already	coping	with	a	world	of	values	and	practices	that	determine	certain	passive	contextual	sensitivities.	Consider	the	alternative	scenario,	one	in	which	perceptions	showed	up	as	requiring	continual	judgment,	where	perceptions	never	showed	up	as	demanding	action	or	announcing	meaning,	and	where	such	truths	required	active	inference	–	this	in	no	way	resembles	the	world	we	live	in.	To	be	sure,	human	subjectivity	does	involve	reflective	conceptual	representations.	What	Merleau-Ponty	reveals	is	that	they	are	involved	far	less	often	than	people	may	think.	In	a	way,	reflective	thought	is	an	interruption	in	our	day-to-day	movements	and	practices.	Most	of	the	time	we	are	absorbed	into	our	tasks	and	routines.	Critical	thought	is	perhaps	a	way	of	lifting	ourselves	out	of	our	situation	to	question	our	routines	and	habits.	However,	as	I	will	argue,	based	on	the	nature	of	
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the	subject	as	habit-body	it	makes	no	practical	sense	to	argue	for	a	perpetual	state	of	active	critical	reflection	and	resistance.			
The	Habit-Body	and	Socially	Mobilized	Subjectivity		Why	is	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	subjectivity	as	the	habit-body	relevant	to	socially	mobilized	subjectivity?	Purcell’s	social	mobilization	makes	passivity	and	heteronomy	the	enemy	of	democracy.	Indeed,	Purcell	argues	that	the	true	democrat	is	someone	who	endeavors	to	be	in	a	perpetual	state	of	active	resistance	against	heteronomy	and	passivity.	However,	as	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology	reveals,	passivity	and	heteronomy	play	a	crucial	role	in	subjectivity.	Indeed,	to	be	able	to	function	in	the	world	is	to	surrender	some	activity	and	autonomy	to	habitual	perception	and	action.	We	must	let	the	world	and	our	situation	influence	our	body	if	we	are	to	function	successfully	in	the	world.		 Perhaps	it	is	possible	to	argue	that	we	need	to	encourage	the	habit	of	active	resistance.	Surely,	developing	new	habits	can	be	a	positive	worthwhile	endeavor.	However,	turning	active	resistance	into	a	habit	would	be	a	category	mistake.	What	I	mean	is,	to	be	habituated	is	to	develop	a	certain	way	of	perceiving	the	world	that	ignores	other	ways	of	perceiving	it,	thus	eliminating	some	critical	nuance.	As	demonstrated	in	the	above	example,	when	you	see	two	people	walking	down	the	street	holding	hands	the	perception	just	assumes	a	couple,	and	ignores	other	possibilities.	It	shows	up	as	if	given	to	you.	To	pull	oneself	out	of	that	given	perception	and	question	it	is	to	transcend	the	habitual	response.	Thus,	to	think	we	might	make	a	habit	out	of	questioning	habitual	givens	is	to	misunderstand	habit.	Or,	in	other	words,	you	cannot	make	a	habit	of	avoiding	habits.			Attempting	to	question	given	perceptions	is	certainly	a	worthy	exercise.	The	problem	I	am	pointing	toward	is	not	with	the	idea	of	questioning	our	perceptions,	but	with	building	an	entire	political	theory	around	the	idea	that	passivity	and	heteronomy	are	somehow	the	enemy	of	justice	and	democracy.	In	a	way	we	are	creatures	of	heteronomy	and	habit.	It	is	ironic	that	Purcell	uses	drug	addiction	as	an	analogy	for	the	democratic	struggle	against	heteronomy.	Indeed,	as	Purcell	put	it,	
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struggling	to	resist	the	‘substance’	of	addiction	because	it	will	kill	you	is	essentially	the	same	justification	for	resisting	oligarchy.	The	reason	this	is	ironic	is	because	of	how	clearly	frivolous	‘the	war	on	drugs’	has	been,	and	how	successful	harm	reduction	treatments	involving	controlled	doses	of	illegal	drugs	has	been.	Thus,	escaping	the	drug	completely	may	not	be	necessary,	and	the	‘war	on	passivity’	as	hopeless	as	the	way	on	drugs.	Indeed,	there	is	considerable	emerging	research	that	argues	that	addiction	has	little	to	do	with	the	substance	itself,	and	more	to	do	with	how	people	use	it	in	their	given	social	and	psychological	context	(Alexander,	2010).	I	would	argue	that	the	same	is	true	with	heteronomy,	not	only	is	it	likely	impossible	to	resist,	but	it	is	also	valuable	for	functioning	subjectivity	(and	political	society).	Indeed,	the	fact	that	when	we	learn	a	skill	it	becomes	almost	automatic	is	the	thing	that	makes	skillfulness	so	useful.		The	truth	of	subjectivity	is	much	more	complicated	than	social	mobilization	seems	to	suggest.	It	is	a	little	bit	too	easy	to	proclaim	‘down	with	heteronomy	and	passivity!’	The	truth	about	the	conditions	that	lead	to	political	action,	resistance,	and	change,	is	that	it	is	a	messy	mixed-up	affair.	As	Merleau-Ponty	aptly	describes,		 Our	freedom,	it	is	said,	is	either	total	or	non-existent.	This	is	a	dilemma	of	objective	thought…	We	are	mixed	up	with	the	world	and	others	in	an	inextricable	confusion.	The	idea	of	a	situation	precludes	there	being	an	absolute	freedom	at	the	origin	of	our	commitments	and,	for	that	matter,	at	their	end.	No	commitment…	can	cause	me	to	transcend	all	differences	and	render	me	free	for	anything	(Merleau-Ponty,	2013,	p.	481).				Indeed,	we	cannot	build	our	hopes	on	transcending	our	conditions	through	radical	freedom.	Our	context,	including	perceptual	habits,	defines	our	possible	actions.	In	this	way	the	landscape	of	possible	political	actions	is	always	in	some	way	given	by	other	conditions,	and	thus	inescapably	contaminated	by	heteronomy.		
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Habits	of	Politics,	The	Politics	of	Habit:	Phenomenological	Lessons		
	As	someone	who	wants	to	see	meaningful	progressive	social	and	political	change	in	planning,	I	think	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology	offers	useful	lessons	about	how	change	might	happen,	and	the	limits	on	that	change.	When	it	comes	to	limits	on	political	change	we	need	only	observe	many	activists	movements.	Part	of	the	problem,	I	would	argue,	is	a	continued	belief	in	the	primacy	of	the	thinking	subject.	That	is,	we	tend	to	believe	our	perceptions	of	the	world	are	accurate	and	not	influenced	by	habits	of	perception.	This	is	evident	if	we	observe	radical	activist	movements	that	purport	to	be	resisting	conditions	of	injustice.	While	most	of	these	activist	groups	begin	with	legitimate	grievances,	and	true	observations,	what	tends	to	happen	is	loss	of	nuance.	Indeed,	what	is	easily	detectable	in	most	activist	movements	is	the	emergence	of	a	kind	of	fundamentalist	consciousness.	Everything	becomes	explainable	by	the	one	injustice	a	given	activist	group	is	fighting	against.	Whether	a	movement	is	on	the	cultural	right,	where	the	grievance	might	be	too	many	immigrants,	or	on	the	cultural	left,	where	the	grievance	might	be	colonialism	and	racism,	the	‘truth’	tends	to	become	a	totalizing	explanation	for	all	injustices.			 Considering	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology,	it	shouldn’t	be	surprising	that	when	people	expose	themselves	to	a	certain	kind	of	social	milieu	they	begin	to	develop	a	corresponding	perceptual	habit.	Indeed,	the	perceived	world	has	effectively	changed	for	people	involved	in	such	movements.	The	habit-body	compels	them	to	notice	certain	details	while	ignoring	others	(a	non-intellectualized	way	of	describing	confirmation	bias).	Just	like	the	botanist	whose	training	compelled	them	to	notice	certain	vegetation,	people	involved	in	political	activism	are	training	themselves	to	perceive	in	a	specific	way,	for	better	or	worse.	The	important	lesson	here	is	to	stop	reducing	people’s	political	beliefs	to	beliefs	at	all.	Habituation	on	Merleau-Ponty’s	view	runs	much	deeper	than	belief.	The	world	literally	presents	itself	passively	to	the	subject	in	a	way	that	is	suggestive	of	their	context.	The	mistake	is	made	when	we	are	too	confident	in	our	ability	to	be	a	thinking	subject,	and	not	open	to	our	vulnerability	as	habit-bodies.	Activists	and	other	political	ideologues	believe	they	are	seeing	clearly	because	they	believe	they	are	a	thinking	subject	that	
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has	uncovered	a	unifying	truth.	However,	Merleau-Ponty	shows	us	that	this	is	far	from	the	case.	The	problem	with	Purcell’s	radical	democratic	politics	is	that	it	reduces	injustice	to	heteronomy.	The	fact	that	we	do	not	have	absolute	control	of	our	conditions	seems	to	be	the	only	concern	for	Purcell.	Purcell’s	faith	in	our	ability	to	‘fight	like	hell’	and	resist	heteronomy	and	passivity	is	I	think	demonstrative	of	his	belief	in	the	thinking	subject	as	primary	mode	of	being.								 Another	important	lesson	offered	by	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology	is	that	it	offers	a	plausible	explanation	for	how	and	why	social	and	political	change	either	happens	or	doesn’t.	Once	we	understand	subjectivity	as	habit-body,	we	realize	that	political	disagreements	are	more	than	intellectual	disagreements.	People	actually	perceive	the	world	in	a	certain	way	based	on	passive	sensitivities	to	certain	contexts,	and	it	takes	tremendous	effort	to	overcome.	People	often	do	not	accept	contrary	evidence	presented	to	them	because	of	how	they	have	developed	perceptual	habits.	There	are	affective	attachments	associated	with	the	ways	people	perceive	their	world	and	it	is	beyond	a	mere	intellectual	task	to	overcome	this.	This	is	also	why	NIMBYism	is	so	prevalent	in	planning.	People,	because	of	their	subjectivity	as	habit-body,	fight	to	stay	in	the	comfort	of	their	existing	perceptual	milieu.	It	takes	more	than	just	arguments	that	appeal	to	people’s	interest	to	foster	political	change.	Sometimes,	dare	I	say	it;	it	needs	to	be	forced	on	them,	if	the	moral	context	demands	it.			
The	Practical	Implications:	Habit	as	Necessity		 The	problem	is,	how	to	do	it	when	things	return	to	normal,	when	people	get	tired	of	being	permanently	mobilized8			 -	Slavoj	Žižek		I	want	to	conclude	by	considering	what	a	political	culture	built	around	real	resistance	to	heteronomy	and	passivity	might	look	like.	Given	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	subjectivity,	what	would	resistance	to	heteronomy	entail?	Escaping																																																									8	At	lecture	at	Círculo	de	Bellas	Artes	de	Madrid	(Spain),	delivered	on	June	28th	2017		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OYSMWJafAI&	
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passivity	and	heteronomy	would	necessarily	entail	subverting	our	habits	of	perception	and	action.	This	follows	from	the	idea	that	habituation	is	a	kind	of	heteronomy	and	should	therefore	be	resisted.	There’s	an	episode	of	a	YouTube	video	series	on	science	called	SmarterEveryDay	that	addresses	this.	In	the	episode,	Destin	(the	YouTuber)	recounts	his	attempt	to	learn	how	to	ride	a	‘backwards	bicycle’	9.	The	bicycle	functions	exactly	like	any	other	bicycle	except	that	when	you	turn	the	handle	left,	the	wheel	turns	right,	and	vice	versa.	In	the	video	Destin	attempts	to	ride	it,	failing	almost	immediately.	Bringing	the	bicycle	with	him	to	talks	all	over	the	world,	person	after	person	fails	exactly	as	Destin	did,	unable	to	keep	the	wheel	straight.	Destin	comes	to	the	conclusion	that	knowledge	does	not	equal	
understanding.	Even	though	he	knows	what	he	needs	to	do	to	make	the	bike	move	the	way	he	wants,	he	can’t	actually	do	it.	Something	isn’t	letting	him.	As	Destin	put	it	in	the	video,	“once	you	have	a	rigid	way	of	thinking	in	your	head,	sometimes	you	cannot	change	that,	even	if	you	want	to”.	I	want	to	suggest	that	there	is	something	very	similar	about	the	idea	of	building	a	society	based	on	resisting	heteronomy.	We	have	the	theoretical	knowledge	of	the	material	steps	we	need	to	take	to	resist	heteronomy	but	we	do	not	really	understand	the	practicality	of	what	it	would	entail.	Destin	has	theoretical	knowledge	of	what	he	needs	to	do	to	ride	the	backwards	bike,	but	his	body	won’t	let	him.	Both	expectations	disregard	the	kinds	of	creatures	of	habit	we	are.		Ultimately	Destin	spent	five	minutes	per	day	for	eight	months	practicing	and	was	finally	able	to	ride	the	backward	bicycle.	The	only	problem	was	that	it	resulted	in	his	no	longer	being	able	to	ride	the	normal	bicycle.	In	a	way,	Purcell’s	social	mobilization	expects	us	to	inhabit	a	space	between	heteronomy	and	autonomy,	a	space	right	before	something	becomes	habit.	It	is	as	if	he	wants	us	to	simultaneously	occupy	the	space	between	riding	a	normal	bike	and	a	backward	bike,	a	space	I	would	argue	we	are	incapable	of	inhabiting.	Indeed,	we	inevitably	fall	to	one	aspect	of	being	or	the	other,	but	not	both.	Therefore	I	want	to	suggest	that	it	is	not	plausible	to	expect	that	subjectivity	can	overcome,	while	perhaps	not	completely,	at																																																									9	Worth	watching:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MFzDaBzBlL0	
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least	significantly,	its	tendency	toward	subjective	passivity	as	described	by	Purcell,	and	implied	by	Friedmann	(claim	2).	Passivity	is	a	crucial	aspect	of	subjectivity	in	that	it	allows	us	to	develop	habitual	perceptions	that	make	being	in	the	world	practical	and	possible.	It	is	true	that	this	fact	also	makes	humans	vulnerable	to	fundamentalism	and	errors	in	thinking.	The	remedy	is	not	to	resist	passivity	and	habit,	but	to	acknowledge	and	better	understand	its	role	in	politics.	I	also	think	this	offers	a	justification	for	heteronomy	in	politics.	While	Purcell	wanted	to	get	beyond	Ranciere’s	view	of	the	political	as	momentary	eruption	and	reconfiguration	of	the	police	order,	I	would	argue	it	is	a	view	much	more	consistent	with	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology.			 [For	Ranciere],	the	democratic	eruption	of	the	people	that	destabilizes	the	partage	du	senible	can	never	be	a	breakthrough,	as	in	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	nor	a	generalization	of	autogestion,	as	in	Lefebvre,	nor	a	hegemonic	shift,	as	in	Laclau	and	Mouffe.	Rather,	the	outcome	is	always	a	resettling,	an	institution	of	a	new	police	order	(Purcell,	2013a,	p.	70).		Indeed,	subjectivity	can	reconfigure	its	habituation	in	much	the	same	way	Ranciere	describes	a	reconfiguration	of	the	police	order.	A	moment	of	clarity	where	I	can	suddenly	ride	the	backwards	bicycle.	Purcell	wants	this	breakthrough	moment	of	resistance	to	heteronomy	to	become	the	generalized	norm.	But	based	on	what	I	have	argued,	this	seems	impossible.		I	do	want	to	affirm	the	importance	of	social	struggles	for	planning	and	politics.	They	can	play	a	hugely	important	role	in	changing	society	for	the	better	by,	as	Ranciere	would	argue,	reconfiguring	the	police	order.	But	we	must	understand	their	limits	in	a	broader	human	context.				
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Conclusion		In	the	above	pages	I	argued	that	social	mobilization	is	a	flawed	view	of	planning.	From	both	an	ethical	and	practical	perspective,	social	mobilizations	offers	little	justification	for	believing	it	to	be	inherently	preferable.	Despite	this	I	want	to	emphasize	that	I	think	social	movements	are	crucially	important	for	any	free	and	progressive	society.	Rather	than	reading	me	as	arguing	that	social	mobilization	should	be	completely	condemned,	I	should	be	read	as	trying	to	determine	some	limits	for	how	social	mobilization	can	be	reasonably	invoked	and	discussed	as	a	solution.	I	want	social	movements	to	be	part	of	a	progressive	political	future	just	not	at	the	expense	of	all	potential	solutions.	My	objection	is	not	with	social	mobilization,	but	how	theorists	like	Friedmann	and	Purcell	transform	it	into	a	totalizing	purity	politics	that	sees	any	transgression	of	the	struggle	for	autonomy	as	contributing	to	the	problem.	Thus,	this	major	paper	should	be	read	as	a	plea	for	nuanced	thinking	in	planning	theory.	Indeed,	I	endorse	thinking	that	doesn’t	reject	the	impurity	of	mixed	solutions	involving	autonomy	and	heteronomy	in	politics.	Purity	politics	does	nothing	but	limit	our	ability	to	evaluate	a	problem	from	many	different	perspectives.				 I	want	to	also	offer	a	preliminary	defense	of	planning	theories	that	focus	on	moral	considerations	of	justice.	An	example	is	Margaret	Kohn’s	solidarist	argument	for	the	right	to	the	city.	The	idea	is	essentially	that	the	city	as	a	division	of	labour,	creates	a	social	product	that	should	not	belong	solely	to	individual	property	owners.	This	is	because	the	city	is	not	reducible	to	a	collection	of	individuals,	but	a	collectively	and	historically	produced	commonwealth.	Put	another	way,	an	incredibly	wealthy	property	owner	relies	on	the	city’s	existence,	and	all	the	people	in	the	present	and	past	that	have	contributed	to	its	construction	and	development.	Indeed,	property	in	a	city	is	valuable	because	many	people	live	and	work	there.	Based	in	this,	the	solidarist	argues	that	when	someone	accumulates	a	disproportionate	share	of	wealth	they	should	have	a	moral	and	contractual	obligation	to	assist	the	worst	off	people	in	the	city	(Kohn,	2016,	p.	24-25).	This	is	
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essentially	a	moral	argument	for	redistribution	of	wealth.	One	of	the	limits	of	social	mobilization	is	that	its	not	clear	how	it	would	arrive	at	a	similar	conclusion,	nor	how	if	could	enforce	this	kind	of	redistribution.	This	is	because	social	mobilization	is	not	based	on	explicit	principles	of	fairness.	Of	course,	social	movements	might	contribute	to	a	popular	movement	that	demands	something	like	a	solidarist	redistribution	of	urban	wealth.	However,	I	also	think	there	is	something	morally	valuable	about	having	institutions	that	enforce	newly	decided	upon	principles	of	justice.	In	a	social	mobilization	model	morally	preferable	arrangement	become	difficult	to	secure	since	all	mechanisms	of	enforcement	are	judged	with	suspicion.		 Finally,	I	want	to	make	some	final	remarks	on	the	political	implications	human	frailty.	While	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenology	provided	an	account	of	how	subjectivity	and	perception	are	influenced	by	habit,	there	are	many	streams	of	science	that	reveal	related	shortcomings	and	vulnerabilities	in	human	judgment.	A	2011	study	found	that	parole	board	judges	grant	parole	just	after	lunch	breaks	at	a	rate	of	65	percent	compared	to	as	low	as	3	percent	just	before	lunch.	This	suggests	that	judgment	might	be	incredibly	vulnerable	to	hunger	(Danziger,	Levav,	&	Avnaim-Pesso,	2011).	Another	study	found	that	the	amount	of	food	a	person	will	eat	can	be	significantly	influenced	by	the	size	and	color	of	the	dinner	plate	(Van	Ittersum	&	Wansink,	2012).	Or	to	take	a	more	famous	example,	the	Milgram	experiment	showed	how	up	to	65	percent	of	participants	could	be	convinced	to	administer	a	fatal	shock	to	a	stranger	if	a	figure	of	authority	(a	man	in	a	lab	coat)	instructed	them	to	do	so	(Milgram,	1963).		My	point	is	to	remind	us	how	vulnerable	human	beings	are	to	suggestion	and	poor	judgment.	At	the	same	time,	we	are	capable	of	identifying	those	vulnerabilities	in	moments	of	reflective	consideration	and	evidence	analysis.	However,	as	Merleau-Ponty	reveals,	these	moments	of	reflective	analysis	are	just	that,	moments.	Most	of	the	time	we	remain	vulnerable	to	mistakes	and	suggestion.	Knowing	this,	it	seems	reasonable	to	prefer	a	political	structure	that	tries	as	best	as	possible	to	correct	for	these	vulnerabilities	through,	for	example,	legal	and	regulatory	frameworks.	This	kind	of	view	is	likely	to	be	unacceptable	for	purveyors	of	social	mobilization	since	it	affirms	the	need	for	heteronomy.	In	a	healthy	political	community	such	frameworks	
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should	of	course	be	open	to	constant	revision	and	critique.	But	based	on	what	we	know	about	human	beings	it	seems	patently	irresponsible	to	suggest	we	should	struggle	against	anything	that	resembles	heteronomy.															
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